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NOTE
INJECTIONS, INFECTIONS, CONDOMS, AND CARE:
THOUGHTS ON NEGLIGENCE AND HIV EXPOSURE
Dustin J. Lee*
Many states have criminal statutes specifically criminalizing the
transmission of the Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV).  This Note
argues that tort, rather than criminal, law should regulate the wrongful
transmission of HIV/AIDS.  The Note then examines the applicability of
various tort doctrines to the peculiar problems presented by this particu-
larly notorious plague, including assumption of the risk and disclosures.
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INTRODUCTION
In his groundbreaking work on the Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) epidemic’s early days, journalist Randy Shilts re-
counts the chilling story of the man believed1 by many to be the epi-
demic’s North American “Patient Zero”: Gaëtan Dugas, an Air Canada
flight attendant.2  Dugas, whose work provided him with free air travel
across the globe, gained a reputation for peculiar post-coital activity.
* J.D. Candidate, Cornell Law School, 2016.
1 Mistakenly believed, as it happens.  Dugas was not, in fact, the vector for HIV in
North America.  Dugas died more than a decade after the death of Robert Rayford, the teen-
ager who is currently North America’s first documented AIDS case. See Gina Kolata, Boy’s
1969 Death Suggests AIDS Invaded U.S. Several Times, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 1987), http://
www.nytimes.com/1987/10/28/us/boy-s-1969-death-suggests-aids-invaded-us-several-
times.html.
2 RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON (1987).
245
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While turning up the lights, Dugas pointed out lesions on his body and
told his partners, “I’ve got gay cancer. . . . I’m going to die and so are
you.”3  Dugas’s behavior—the careless, shameless, and intentional
spread of a frightful, then-fatal disease—represented an unsavory stereo-
type for homosexuals and terrified heterosexual, polite society.
In the years that followed, understandings of this new “gay cancer”
evolved.  Scientists across the nation renamed the disease Acquired Im-
mune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) and discovered its methods of pro-
gression and transmission.  Fear, however, remained the epidemic’s
signature trait.  Fear was the foundation for wild-eyed calls for quaran-
tine,4 widespread discrimination against those living with AIDS (and
those who have died because of it),5 and laws criminalizing transmission
and exposure to HIV.
More than half of U.S. states have laws criminalizing transmission
of HIV.  Generally, the laws require HIV-positive individuals to disclose
that they are HIV-positive to their sexual partner prior to sexual activity.
Iowa’s statute takes the somewhat unusual construction of illegalizing
HIV exposure but naming disclosure as an affirmative defense.6  How-
ever, not all of the statutes require disclosure.  Alabama’s, for example,
apparently regards disclosure as irrelevant.  It facially disallows any sex-
ual contact leading to infection.7  Regardless of their specific construc-
3 Id. at 165.
4 See, e.g., Poll Indicates Majority Favor Quarantine for AIDS Victims, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 20, 1985), http://www.nytimes.com/1985/12/20/us/poll-indicates-majority-favor-quaran-
tine-for-aids-victims.html.  Unfortunately, calls for quarantine may not be merely relics from
the early days of the crisis. See also David Freedlander, Kansas Quarantine Bill Has HIV/
AIDS Advocates Up in Arms, DAILY BEAST (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/
articles/2013/04/02/kansas-quarantine-bill-has-hiv-aids-advocates-up-in-arms.html (discussing
a Kansas bill that would allow the state to quarantine people with infectious diseases).
5 See Jane Gross, Funerals for AIDS Victims: Searching for Sensitivity, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 13, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/02/13/nyregion/funerals-for-aids-victims-
searching-for-sensitivity.html (detailing funeral home and mortuary discrimination against
those who have died of AIDS).
6 See the infamous Iowa statute (which has since been amended) used to convict Nick
Rhoades:
A person who knows that he or she is infected with HIV commits criminal transmis-
sion if he or she: (1) engages in intimate contact with another person; (2) transfers,
donates or provides blood, tissue, semen, organs, or other potentially infectious bod-
ily fluids for administration (e.g., transfusion) to another person; or (3) in any way
transfers to another person any nonsterile intravenous or intramuscular drug para-
phernalia previously used by the person infected with HIV. “Intimate contact” means
the intentional exposure of the body of one person to a bodily fluid of another person
in a manner that could result in the transmission of HIV. Actual transmission of HIV
is not a necessary element of this crime. It is an affirmative defense that the person
exposed to HIV knew the other person had HIV, knew the action could result in
transmission of HIV, and consented to the action with that knowledge.
IOWA CODE § 709C.1, repealed by 2014 Iowa Acts, ch. 1119, § 9.
7 Note that unlike the usual statutes, disclosure is not statutorily required, and unlike the
Iowa statute, disclosure is not an affirmative defense. See ALA. CODE § 22-11A-21(c) (2006)
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tions, these statutes impose criminal sanctions on HIV-positive
individuals for the perceived risk presented by what is called their “sero-
status”—the quality of being either HIV-positive or HIV-negative.
The application of such criminal statutes results in convictions like
that of Nick Rhoades, an Iowa man whose viral load was reduced
through avid treatment to undetectable levels, which greatly reduced his
chances of transmitting the virus.8  Rhoades—who used a condom dur-
ing the incident in question—was sentenced to twenty-five years in
prison on the basis of a single sexual encounter because he did not dis-
close his HIV-positive status to his sexual partner.9  Though Rhoades did
not infect his sexual partner, he was still convicted.10  The Iowa statute
specifically notes that actual transmission is not required for criminal
sanctions; merely the possibility that transmission could occur is suffi-
cient.11  On the other hand, cases like Nushawn Williams’s—who in-
fected more than ten sexual partners, allegedly with the intention of
transmitting the HIV virus12—lead to hysteria and support for criminal
statutes regarding HIV exposure.13  In reality, intentional infections are
exceedingly rare, though when they occur (or allegedly occur), they are
widely and notoriously reported,14 further warping public understanding
of the issue.
This Note argues that criminal sanctions, by virtue of the societal
reproof inhering in them and their rigid application in comparison to tort
liability, are an inappropriate response to the problem of HIV exposure.
On the other hand, tort liability and the “reasonable person” standard of
(“Any person afflicted with a sexually transmitted disease who shall knowingly transmit, or
assume the risk of transmitting, or do any act which will probably or likely transmit such
disease to another person shall be guilty of a Class C misdemeanor.”).  Little case law inter-
prets this problematic provision.  Nonetheless, apparently concluding that the penalty for a
misdemeanor is insufficient, the Alabama legislature has moved to make this offense a felony.
H.B. 50, 2015 Reg. Sess. (Ala. 2015).
8 Rhoades v. State, 848 N.W.2d 22, 25 (Iowa 2014).
9 Id. at 26.
10 See id.
11 IOWA CODE § 709C.1 (2006) (“This section shall not be construed to require that an
infection with the human immunodeficiency virus has occurred for a person to have committed
criminal transmission of the human immunodeficiency virus.”).  Criminal transmission in-
volves merely “intimate contact” by an HIV-positive individual.
12 See New York v. Williams, 938 N.Y.S.2d 717, 718 (App. Div. 2012).
13 Then-Mayor of New York, Rudy Giuliani, declared that Williams “should be prose-
cuted for attempted murder, or worse.”  Jane Gross, Trail of Arrests, H.I.V. Fears and a Wo-
man’s Tale of Love, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 1997), http://www.nytimes.com/1997/10/29/
nyregion/trail-of-arrests-hiv-fears-and-a-woman-s-tale-of-love.html.
14 See, e.g., Amanda Mikelberg, HIV-Positive Man Who Intentionally Infected
“Thousands” of Partners Turns Himself In, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Dec. 30, 2011), http://
www.nydailynews.com/life-style/health/hiv-positive-man-intentionally-infected-thousands-
partners-turns-article-1.999178; Graham Gremore, Man Learns He Was Intentionally Infected
with HIV via Facebook Message, QUEERTY (Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.queerty.com/man-
learns-he-was-intentionally-infected-with-hiv-via-facebook-message-20140827.
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care present a flexible solution to the varied and complex situations in
which HIV-exposure claims are likely to arise.
Part I of this Note provides a brief history of criminal statutes ad-
dressing HIV exposure.  Part II of this Note examines the criminal stat-
utes in greater detail, and explains why they are an inadequate and
inelegant solution to the problem of HIV exposure.  Part III of this Note
discusses why civil liability is a superior method of addressing the HIV
exposure problem in modern society and briefly considers the future of
criminal liability for HIV transmission.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF HIV-RELATED CRIMINAL LEGISLATION
In its early days, the HIV/AIDS plague inspired fear without equal
among modern diseases in the United States.15  The disease produced
terror wildly disproportionate to its spread and transmission: one member
of the President’s AIDS Commission declared that AIDS threatened to
bring about the extinction of mankind.16  Widespread misunderstanding
about the disease’s spread and transmission led to unrealistic and inflated
fears among the general public.17  HIV/AIDS presented a salacious com-
bination: it was a fearsome and deadly disease that was perceived to be
spread largely through taboo sex acts among an abhorred sexual minor-
ity.  This combination produced not only fear, but also stigma and hatred
on an unprecedented level.18
HIV/AIDS—because of its plague-like spread among homosexu-
als—was used as a tool for moral vindication by conventional society.
For example, Pat Buchanan famously declared in a 1983 newspaper col-
umn that “[t]he poor homosexuals . . . have declared war upon nature,
and now nature is exacting an awful retribution.”19  His opinion was far
from uncommon.  The late Senator Jesse Helms of North Carolina was
famed for his fight against AIDS research and funding.20  Senator Helms
felt that AIDS was uniformly caused by homosexual conduct and be-
lieved that the disease was a divine punishment for homosexuality.  He
15 WILLIAM A. RUSHING, THE AIDS EPIDEMIC: SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF AN INFECTIOUS
DISEASE 129 (1995) (“HIV-AIDS has been the most feared infectious disease since the emer-
gence of germ theory and the most stigmatized disease in modern times.”).
16 Id. at 149.
17 See id. at 151.
18 Id. at 170 (“More than victims of any disease in modern times, people with HIV-AIDS
have been viewed with disgust and hatred and treated as social pariahs.”).
19 SAMUEL WELLS, CHRISTIAN ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTORY READER 259 (2010).
20 See WILLIAM A. LINK, RIGHTEOUS WARRIOR: JESSE HELMS AND THE RISE OF MODERN
CONSERVATISM 350 (2008); see also Edward I. Koch, Senator Helms’s Callousness Toward
AIDS Victims, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 1987), http://www.nytimes.com/1987/11/07/opinion/sena
tor-helms-s-callousness-toward-aids-victims.html.
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declared on the Senate floor that there was “not one single case of AIDS
reported in this country that cannot be traced in origin to sodomy.”21
The potent mélange of public fear and moral conviction was an un-
commonly effective motivator for state legislatures.  In response to the
disease, they created laws that addressed HIV/AIDS more aggressively
than any prior epidemic.22  Among these laws were statutes which ex-
pose HIV-positive individuals to criminal sanctions for engaging in sex-
ual activity without disclosing their serostatus to their sexual partners,
infecting their sexual partners with HIV, or simply exposing their sexual
partners to HIV.  Also common are laws that do not criminalize the
transmission or exposure of HIV specifically, but criminalize the trans-
mission or exposure of sexually transmitted infections generally.
II. CRIMINAL LIABILITY FOR HIV EXPOSURE
Criminal laws are not merely a mode of punishment; they also ex-
press a society’s moral sensibility and disapproval of certain behaviors.23
Behaviors that create problems for others but require no great censure are
better addressed through the civil tort system.  Behaviors deemed partic-
ularly deserving of society’s reproach are addressed through the criminal
system.  It is important to consider, too, that there is no particular reason
why HIV transmission cannot be addressed through conventional and
broad criminal statutes that address homicide, assault, and attempt.24  In-
deed, the first HIV transmission prosecutions were brought under such
statutes.25
HIV transmission statutes cover a wide array of behaviors through a
variety of modes.  Sometimes, knowledge of the infected partner’s seros-
tatus by the exposed partner is an affirmative defense, as in Iowa’s HIV
transmission statute, Iowa Code § 709C.1.  That statute provides an af-
firmative defense if the exposed person knew that his or her sexual part-
ner was infected.26  Thus, to benefit from this affirmative defense, the
21 LINK, supra note 20, at 350. R
22 See DAVID W. WEBBER, AIDS AND THE LAW 7-3 (4th ed. Supp. 2011).
23 As Professors Dressler and Garvey note in a criminal law casebook, “What distin-
guishes a criminal from a civil sanction . . . is the judgment of community condemnation
which accompanies and justifies its imposition.” JOSHUA DRESSLER & STEPHEN P. GARVEY,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 2 (6th ed. 2012).  The editors quote Professor
George Gardner’s declaration that criminal conviction is “the expression of the community’s
hatred, fear, or, contempt.” George K. Gardner, Bailey v. Richardson and the Constitution of
the United States, 33 B.U. L. REV. 176, 193 (1953).
24 See, e.g., State v. Haines, 545 N.E.2d 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); see also Lori A.
David, The Legal Ramifications in Criminal Law of Knowingly Transmitting AIDS, 19 LAW &
PSYCHOL. REV. 259 (1995).
25 See Michael L. Closen et al., Criminalization of an Epidemic: HIV-AIDS and Criminal
Exposure Laws, 46 ARK. L. REV. 921 (1994).
26 IOWA CODE § 709C.1(5) (2006) (“It is an affirmative defense that the person exposed
to the human immunodeficiency virus knew that the infected person had a positive human
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exposed person must know that sexual conduct might result in transmis-
sion even if the infected person did not disclose his or her serostatus to
the partner.27  Florida’s statute follows the Iowa approach.  Though it
does not specifically name the affirmative defense, disclosure is a shield
from criminal liability under the Florida statute.28  Like the Iowa statute,
the Florida statute only requires that the exposed party has “been in-
formed” of his or her partner’s serostatus—not that he or she was in-
formed by the infected person.  Other statutes require disclosure by the
infected person.  Idaho’s statute, for example, specifically requires that
the accused disclose his serostatus.29  Finally, some statutes appear to
offer no affirmative defense based upon disclosure.  Alabama’s HIV
transmission statute apparently does not leave room for an affirmative
defense of disclosure or consent.  It criminalizes the infected party’s tak-
ing of any action that will “likely transmit” a sexually transmitted
disease.30
HIV transmission statutes generally do not require actual transmis-
sion of HIV for the crime of transmission to occur.  Iowa’s criminal stat-
ute explicitly states that actual transmission of HIV need not occur to
sustain a conviction of criminal transmission of HIV.31  Alarmingly, the
statutes often criminalize behavior that simply cannot lead to infection.
immunodeficiency virus status at the time of the action of exposure, knew that the action of
exposure could result in transmission of the human immunodeficiency virus, and consented to
the action of exposure with that knowledge.”).
27 One could imagine a situation in which the exposed partner is aware of the infected
partner’s serostatus through gossip, mutual friends, or even deduction from the evidence of
medications on the counter.  The language of the Iowa statute suggests that so long as the
exposed person has the knowledge that the infected person is infected, and understands the
possible consequences of such infection, the infected partner could raise an affirmative
defense.
28 See FLA. STAT. § 384.24(2) (2014) (“It is unlawful for any person who has human
immunodeficiency virus infection, when such person knows he or she is infected with this
disease and when such person has been informed that he or she may communicate this disease
to another person through sexual intercourse, to have sexual intercourse with any other person,
unless such other person has been informed of the presence of the sexually transmissible dis-
ease and has consented to the sexual intercourse.”).
29 The statute reads: “It is an affirmative defense that the sexual activity took place be-
tween consenting adults after full disclosure by the accused of the risk of such activity.”
IDAHO CODE § 39-608(3)(a) (2014).  The language here appears to put the onus of ensuring
knowledge upon the infected person, requiring him to disclose his serostatus himself, and
denying him the benefit of the affirmative defense if he does disclose, regardless of the other
party’s knowledge.
30 ALA. CODE § 22-11A-21(c) (2006) (“Any person afflicted with a sexually transmitted
disease who shall knowingly transmit, or assume the risk of transmitting, or do any act which
will probably or likely transmit such disease to another person shall be guilty of a Class C
misdemeanor.”).
31 The statute explicitly allows for criminal transmission when no actual transmission
has, in fact, occurred. See IOWA CODE § 709C.1.4 (2003).  (“This section shall not be con-
strued to require that an infection with the human immunodeficiency virus has occurred for a
person to have committed criminal transmission of the human immunodeficiency virus.”)
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For example, Louisiana’s HIV transmission statute criminalizes not only
sexual conduct by the infected individual, but also “biting” or “spit-
ting.”32  Statutes which criminalize behavior that cannot in any real sense
transmit HIV—like Louisiana’s statute33—are not only needlessly over-
broad.  They also perpetuate mistaken conceptions of HIV/AIDS and
hurt those living with the disease.
Statutes criminalizing HIV transmission disproportionately affect
certain socioeconomic, racial, and sexual classes.  According to the
American Psychological Association, people of a lower socioeconomic
status are more likely to engage in risky sexual behaviors that spread
HIV, and less likely to be able to afford effective treatments.34  Those of
a lower socioeconomic status are also more likely to engage in needle
sharing among drug addicts, another major vector of HIV transmission.35
African Americans are also disproportionately affected by HIV/AIDS.
By sheer numbers alone, they are the ethnic group most affected by the
disease.36  Finally, those most associated in the public mind with HIV/
AIDS are homosexuals.  Statistically, men who have sex with men are
the group most affected by HIV/AIDS in the nation.37  In the subset of
men who have sex with men, African-American men are the most se-
verely affected.38  Since the HIV/AIDS first struck the community, it has
been a major force in shaping gay culture—from novels39 and plays40 to
films.41
32 Consider the definition assigned to “means” in LA. REV. STAT. § 14:43.5(D)(1)
(2014).  The statute defines “means or contact” as “spitting, biting, stabbing with an AIDS
contaminated object, or throwing of blood or other bodily substances.” LA. REV. STAT.
§ 14:43.5(D)(1) (2014).
33 HIV Transmission, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/
hiv/basics/transmission.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2014) (“HIV cannot be spread through sa-
liva, and there is no documented case of transmission from an HIV-infected person spitting on
another person.”).
34 HIV/AIDS & Socioeconomic Status, AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS’N, http://www.apa.org/
pi/ses/resources/publications/factsheet-hiv-aids.aspx (last visited Nov. 17, 2015).
35 See id.
36 HIV Among African Americans, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://
www.cdc.gov/HIV/risk/racialethnic/aa/index.html (last visited Feb. 11, 2014).
37 HIV Among Gay and Bisexual Men, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/risk/gender/msm/ (last visited Sept. 25, 2014).
38 See HIV Among African American Gay and Bisexual Men, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CON-
TROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/group/msm/bmsm.html (last visited Nov. 17,
2015).
39 For a particularly deft example, the author recommends Andrew Holleran’s under-
stated and poetic masterpiece, The Beauty of Men. ANDREW HOLLERAN, THE BEAUTY OF MEN
(1st ed. 1996).
40 Notable is Larry Kramer’s The Normal Heart, which was recently produced as a film
by HBO. The Normal Heart (HBO television broadcast May 25, 2014).
41 See, e.g., LONGTIME COMPANION (Samuel Goldwyn Co. 1989); PHILADELPHIA (TriStar
Pictures 1993).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\25-1\CJP105.txt unknown Seq: 8 23-DEC-15 16:59
252 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 25:245
There is an obvious argument for criminalization of transmission to
be gleaned from these statistics.  By discouraging risky sexual practices
and transmission, one might think that criminalization helps these com-
munities.  But blanket criminalization is not an efficient or effective way
to combat the complex phenomena causing high rates of infection in the
aforementioned communities.42  Those actually interested in decreasing
transmission rates through a legal framework should instead champion
education and health assistance programs.43
Statutes criminalizing HIV transmission have come under heavy fire
recently, particularly with the rise of cases such as that of Nick Rhoades.
Recall, Rhoades was convicted of criminal transmission of HIV and sen-
tenced to twenty-five years in prison.44  He was convicted on the basis of
a single encounter, during which he used a condom.45  Moreover, be-
cause of his treatment, Rhoades’s viral load during that encounter was
undetectable.46  As will be discussed in more detail, new studies suggest
that an undetectable viral load carries virtually no chance of transmis-
sion.47  Unsurprisingly, actual transmission did not occur as a result of
Rhoades’s encounter.  Nonetheless, he was convicted and sentenced.
Ultimately, the Iowa Supreme Court set aside his conviction on
grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel.48  However, the court’s
opinion was primarily concerned with the factual issues it perceived in
the case.  The court worried that to allow the sentence to stand would
imprison Rhoades for “something that can only theoretically occur.”49
Later, the court refused to take notice of the idea that a person with an
undetectable viral load can infect his sexual partner.50  The court inter-
preted the Iowa criminal transmission statute’s use of the word “possi-
ble” not to mean merely “not impossible,” but rather to hold an inherent
reasonableness requirement.51  This awkward interpretation was subject
to a blistering dissent.  That the court decided the case on an issue of
substantive justice—rather than ineffective assistance of counsel—seems
to be a better reflection of the court’s reasoning.
The court’s decision turned on the point that the district court did
not have a “factual basis” to accept the guilty plea.52  The court then
examined the facts of Rhoades’s case to decide that there was no “factual
42 WEBBER, supra note 22, at 7-3. R
43 Id.
44 Rhoades v. State, 848 N.W.2d 22, 25–26 (Iowa 2014).
45 Id. at 26.
46 Id. at 25.
47 See infra note 84. R
48 Rhoades, 848 N.W.2d at 23.
49 Id. at 28.
50 Id. at 32.
51 Id. at 27–28.
52 Id. at 33.
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basis” to his guilty plea.53  The court effectively ruled that Rhoades’s
lawyer was incompetent for allowing Rhoades to plead guilty to sexual
conduct without disclosing his serostatus to his sexual partner, when, in
fact, Rhoades did just that.
Indeed, faced with the peculiarity of such an outcome, Justice
Mansfield wrote in his concurrence that the court used ineffective coun-
sel as a proxy for a plain error rule.54  Justice Mansfield went on to con-
cur in the court’s result “without finding fault in the performance of
Rhoades’s defense counsel.”55  These judicial gymnastics avoided a
manifestly unjust outcome, but they were only necessary because of an
overbroad and unreasonable statute that was predicated largely on a pub-
lic fear that has far outlived its rationality.
III. TORT LIABILITY FOR HIV EXPOSURE
Tort liability is a more flexible and elegant solution to the problem
of HIV exposure.  For one thing, tort law’s dynamic approach allows a
more intimate, case-by-case examination of the facts.  Unlike criminal
law, negligence liability is responsive to the circumstances surrounding
each case, an important point in fact patterns as emotionally and person-
ally fraught as those involving sexually transmitted infections.  Most im-
portantly, through the reasonable person standard, tort liability
encourages more caution and care by those who are HIV-positive, rather
than pushing their behavior underground.56
Liability for transmission could be imposed for a number of torts,
including battery, negligence, and intentional or negligent infliction of
emotional distress.  While all of these torts raise interesting issues, negli-
gence is the focus of this Note, so the analysis will largely center on the
tort of negligence.  Battery, an intentional tort, can take two forms: either
a forced contact resulting in transmission (which could result in serious
criminal repercussions, as well as tort liability)57 or a consensual contact
after a misrepresentation of one’s HIV-positive status.58  Such a misrep-
53 See id. at 23.
54 Id. at 33 (Mansfield, J., concurring) (“In some respects, we are using ineffective assis-
tance as a substitute for a plain error rule, which we do not have in Iowa.”).
55 Id. at 34 (Mansfield, J., concurring).
56 Closen et al., supra note 25, at 933 (pointing out that criminal liability may simply R
drive conduct underground).  Professor Schultz also makes the point that when criminal liabil-
ity requires knowledge of an HIV infection, those who suspect their HIV status is positive will
be discouraged from seeking testing, which will impose the possibility of criminal sanctions
for sexual conduct. Id.
57 Namely, a rape conviction. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW
567 (6th ed. 2012).
58 See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 43 (1999) (“[M]ost states regard the mere nondisclo-
sure of serious medical conditions prior to intercourse as a species of fraud capable of overrid-
ing consent.”).
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resentation constitutes fraud in the inducement, and vitiates consent.59
Fraud in the inducement can be either implied or apparent.60
For their part, both negligent and intentional infliction of emotional
distress are notoriously difficult claims to prove.61  In the context of
HIV-transmission, intentional infliction of emotional distress might look
strikingly similar to the behavior of Gaëtan Dugas.  Dugas, who knew he
was HIV-positive, intentionally engaged in risky behavior to distress his
sexual partner.  The heinousness required to prove claims of negligent or
intentional infliction of emotional distress is considerable, and it must
result from behavior “so outrageous in character, and so extreme in de-
gree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency.”62  In Whelan v.
Whelan, a Connecticut court found that spitefully and untruthfully claim-
ing to have HIV during the dissolution of a marriage was sufficiently
outrageous because such a claim would likely result in “shock and fright
of enormous proportions.”63
The intensity of emotional distress must be proven.  In one case for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court recognized that it
could infer extreme emotional distress from the fact that a party realized
he or she may have been infected with HIV, but “that inference alone is
not sufficient to support a claim for emotional distress.”64  Furthermore,
the distress must meet an objective reasonable person standard.65  For
example, the case of Reynolds v. Highland Manor involved a traveler
who inadvertently picked up a used condom in her motel room.66  Here,
the chance of actual injury from picking up the condom was unreasona-
bly slight, and so the court found the emotional distress resulting from it
was also unreasonable.67  In Majca v. Beekil, a woman discovered
months after an office injury that her employer was HIV-positive.  How-
ever, the court held that because she had been tested numerous times for
59 Id.
60 Id. (“Nor is an explicit verbal lie necessary to override P’s consent.  If D covers up his
body sores with talcum powder, or removes his AIDS medications from plain view, these acts
of deliberate concealment, while difficult to prove, are in principle as wrongful as any other
overt fraud.”).
61 See id. at 18.
62 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 cmt. D. (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
63 Whelan v. Whelan, 588 A.2d 251, 253 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1991).
64 J.B. v. Bohonovsky, 835 F. Supp. 796, 798 (D.N.J. 1993) (“It is not unreasonable to
infer that upon learning that one’s lover has AIDS, there is a period of intense anxiety awaiting
the result of one’s own tests over an extended period of time.  But that inference alone is not
sufficient to support a claim for emotional distress.  What makes that claim viable is the inten-
sity of the distress, not its mere existence.”).
65 Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis Health Servs., 868 S.W.2d 585, 594 (Tenn. 1993).
66 Reynolds v. Highland Manor, 954 P.2d 11, 12–13 (Kan. Ct. App. 1998).
67 Id. at 15. (“Anxiety about a disease or condition developing from a physical injury is
not recoverable as an element of mental distress where the medical evidence indicates the
chance of such occurring is slight. . . . Because her fear of contracting the disease is unreasona-
ble as a matter of law, she may not recover damages.”).
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HIV and had never tested positive for the infection, her distress upon
discovering her employer’s serostatus was unreasonable.68
In fact, in addressing problems such as those in Reynolds or Majca,
a majority of courts require that actual exposure to HIV occur as a pre-
requisite of reasonableness in a claim of negligent or intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress.69  The court in Carroll v. Sisters of St. Francis
Health Services found that “the plaintiff must prove, at a minimum, that
he or she was actually exposed to HIV.”70  Likewise, the court in John-
son v. American National Red Cross found that absent proof of exposure,
“the damages must be considered whimsical, fanciful and above all too
speculative to form the basis of recovery.”71  However, the requirement
of actual exposure is not recognized in all jurisdictions.72  The court in
Faya v. Almaraz did not require actual exposure, noting certain alarming
characteristics of HIV/AIDS, including the fact that it is blood-borne and
can have a long latency period.73  The Faya court refused to issue a judg-
ment as a matter of law, despite the fact that there was no proof of
exposure.74
Addressing contagious diseases through tort law is not a new idea.
Early tort cases evinced great concern for contagious livestock, ex-
tending negligence liability to owners of sheep and hogs that spread dis-
ease.75  Courts also applied negligence liability to infectious diseases of
humans.  For example, the court in a 1910 case, Hendricks v. Butcher,
68 Majca v. Beekil, 701 N.E.2d 1084, 1090 (Ill. 1998).
69 This seems to be a common requirement across state lines. See, e.g., Johnson v. Am.
Nat’l Red Cross, 578 S.E.2d 106 (Ga. 2003); Majca, 701 N.E.2d 1084; Reynolds, 954 P.2d 11;
Bain v. Wells, 936 S.W.2d 618 (Tenn. 1997); Carroll, 868 S.W.2d 585; see also Heiner v.
Moretuzzo, 652 N.E.2d 664 (Ohio 1995) (requiring those raising emotional distress claims to
have been placed in actual peril).
70 Carroll, 868 S.W.2d at 594.
71 Johnson, 578 S.E.2d at 110 (citing Russaw v. Martin, 472 S.E.2d 508, 511 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1996)).
72 See, e.g., Faya v. Almaraz, 620 A.2d 327, 336–37 (Md. 1993).
73 Id. at 332, 336–37.
74 Id. at 339.  The facts of Faya are interesting, involving a surgeon who had HIV/AIDS
and continued to operate.  Upon his death, his patients discovered his ailment, to their conster-
nation.  From an article in the Philadelphia Inquirer: “[T]he case of Dr. Almaraz, who died of
AIDS on Nov. 16 at the age of 41, has frightened and angered his patients—mostly women
with breast cancer—even though doctors say their risk of having contracted AIDS from Al-
maraz is extremely low. . . . [One patient] described Almaraz as a brilliant surgeon and charis-
matic person ‘with great empathy for his patients.’  But she said she had ‘mixed feelings’
because ‘you realize that this could be the man who killed you.’”  Matthew Purdy, Doctor’s
Aids Death Raises Worries, PHILA. INQUIRER (Dec. 7, 1990), http://articles.philly.com/1990-
12-07/news/25922401_1_rudolph-almaraz-aids-virus-cancer-surgeon.  The article demon-
strates the fearful power of the AIDS epidemic in its early days.
75 See, e.g., Demetz v. Benton, 35 Mo. App. 559, 563 (1889) (finding that allowing one’s
hogs to transmit disease can be negligence); Johnson v. Wallower, 18 Minn. 288, 294 (1872)
(finding that liability covered both a contagious horse sold to the plaintiff and the plaintiff’s
other horse, which was infected by the purchased horse).
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established a duty of care for those infected with smallpox not to spread
their infection.76  Courts also apply negligence principles to sexually
transmitted diseases.77  The Maine Supreme Judicial Court recognized a
claim for negligent transmission of a sexually transmitted disease, stat-
ing: “We can conceive of no principled reason to distinguish . . . infec-
tion with a disease, from any other physical harm that could befall a
person because of the negligence of another, and for which we would
recognize a cause of action in negligence.”78 One Oklahoma case even
extends negligence liability for a sexually transmitted infection from an
infected mistress to her faithless inamorato’s wife, who later became
infected.79
This Note argues that the better approach is to apply negligence
liability and a reasonable person standard of care for sexually active
adults who are HIV-positive as well as those who are not.  A few notable
questions arise when considering the application of negligence liability
for HIV transmission: (a) what constitutes reasonable care, (b) should
disclosure be required in the tort regime, (c) what risks does the average
sexually active adult assume, and (d) is there still a place for criminal
prosecutions of intentional and malicious transmission?
Any discussion of tort liability hinges upon tort’s famous standard,
beloved by law professors and despised by first-year students: the rea-
sonable person.  Since the venerable English case of Vaughan v.
Menlove, an objective standard has ruled tort law.80  Unlike criminal law,
the tort of negligence only expects people to employ an average level of
caution and reason.81  It is an eminently human standard, one more easily
76 Hendricks v. Butcher, 129 S.W. 431, 432 (1910) (“[W]e have no hesitancy in holding
that any one afflicted with the disease of smallpox, which is known by every one to be a highly
contagious disease, owes to every one the duty to so conduct himself as not to communicate
this disease to them after he becomes aware that he is afflicted with it.”).
77 See, e.g., Deuschle v. Jobe, 30 S.W.3d 215, 219 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that a
girlfriend infected with herpes by her boyfriend stated a claim for negligence); McPherson v.
McPherson, 712 A.2d 1043 (Me. 1998).
78 McPherson, 712 A.2d at 1045.
79 Lockhart v. Loosen, 943 P.2d 1074, 1081 (Okla. 1997) (“If Loosen knew the plain-
tiff’s identity and recognized her as someone with whom her sexual partner would later copu-
late and she did not tell him she had herpes before he engaged in sex with this third person, it
can be found that a natural and probable consequence of her silence is that Lockhart would
communicate this highly contagious disease to the third person.”); see also Doe v. Johnson,
817 F. Supp. 1382 (W.D. Mich. 1993) (recognizing claims for negligence against a party, A,
who knew his serostatus and that his sexual partner had sex with others, but neglected to
inform his partner of his infection).
80 Vaughan v. Menlove, 3 Bing. (N.C.) 468, 132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837); see also
EPSTEIN, supra note 58, at 111. R
81 As Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote with characteristic eloquence: “[H]e who is intelli-
gent and prudent does not act at his peril, in theory of law.  On the contrary, it is only when he
fails to exercise the foresight of which he is capable, or exercises it with evil intent, that he is
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applicable to reality surrounding HIV/AIDS than the strict and inflexible
commands of criminal law.
However, precisely because of its flexibility, the reasonable person
standard is malleable and opaque.  What does the reasonable person do
when faced with a sexual encounter that might transmit HIV?  As dis-
cussed above, public fear of HIV far outstrips the statistical likelihood of
contracting the disease.82  HIV, contrary to popular belief, is relatively
difficult to transmit if safe-sex methods are used.83  Depending on the
patient’s medical circumstances, the chances of transmitting HIV can
range from alarming to negligible.  Indeed, a new scientific study sug-
gests that it is virtually impossible to transmit HIV if a patient’s viral
load is undetectable.84
A. A Modern Scheme of Reasonable Care for HIV Positive
Individuals
The elements of the tort of negligence are simple: (1) the defendant
owes the plaintiff a duty of care, (2) the defendant’s conduct fell below
the standard of care expected of a reasonable person, (3) the defendant’s
failure to meet the standard of care was the cause of the plaintiff’s harm,
and (4) the plaintiff was, in fact, harmed.85  A myriad of courts have
found a duty on the part of an infected person to protect his or her sexual
partners from infection.86
Though the reasonable person standard is objective, it is closely
sensitive to circumstances.  The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability
for Physical and Emotional Harm states that “[a]n actor is negligent in
answerable for the consequences.” OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 108–
09 (1881).
82 See RUSHING, supra note 15, at 151 (“In light of the actual risks, to say that such fears R
were unrealistic grossly understates the matter.”).
83 Canadian Scientists Agree that HIV is Difficult to Transmit Sexually, CTR. FOR HIV
LAW & POLICY (May 2, 2014), http://www.hivlawandpolicy.org/fine-print-blog/canadian-
scientists-agree-hiv-difficult-transmit-sexually.
84 The PARTNER study, conducted by the Center for Health and Infectious Disease
Research and funded by the National Institute for Health Research in the UK and the Swiss
Office for Public Health, involves serodiscordant couples (by 2014, the study included 1,145
couples) who regularly engage in sexual intercourse with each other, without the use of con-
doms.  Since the study’s creation in 2010, no HIV transmission has been recorded from an
individual with an undetectable viral load to his partner. Q & A for PARTNER Studies: In-
terim Analysis Results Presented at CROI 2014, CTR. FOR HEALTH & INFECTIOUS DISEASE
RESEARCH, http://www.chip.dk/portals/0/files/CROI_2014_PARTNER_QA.pdf (last visited
Nov. 18, 2015). But see HIV Transmission, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/basics/transmission.html (last visited Jan. 16, 2015) (“A person with
HIV can still potentially transmit HIV to a partner even if they have an undetectable viral
load . . . .”).
85 EPSTEIN, supra note 58, at 109–10. R
86 See, e.g., Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So. 2d 686, 689 (Ala. 1989); R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428
N.W.2d 103, 108 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988).
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engaging in conduct if the actor does not exercise reasonable care.”87  By
placing the onus of complying with the objective standard upon the actor
instead of the victim, the objective standard requires a deficient or dan-
gerous person to take additional precautions because that person has the
foreknowledge of their own infirmity.88
Thus, just as a person with impaired eyesight will be expected to
wear glasses while driving an automobile even though those with excel-
lent vision need not, a person who is HIV-positive must take precautions
that an HIV-negative person need not.  The question, of course, is: what
precautions constitute reasonable care by a person who is HIV-positive?
The question of what precautions are required would ultimately be one
answered by a finder of fact, but certain edges might be sketched out
here.  Condom use is certainly part of the reasonable standard of care89
and antiretroviral therapy likely is, as well.90
Finally, though sexually active HIV-positive individuals bear a
heavier standard of care than sexually active HIV-negative individuals
do, under a tort theory of transmission liability, the entirety of responsi-
bility does not rest upon the HIV-positive individual’s shoulders.  By
engaging in sexual activity, all sexually active individuals assume the
risk that they will contract sexually transmitted infections.  The risk of
87 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM
§ 4 (AM. LAW INST. 2011).
88 EPSTEIN, supra note 58, at 113 (“The objective standard encourages sensible steps R
toward accident precaution by inducing people with below-average abilities to stay out of
harm’s way in the first instance.”).
89 Condom use is uniformly urged from a variety of sources.  The CDC states simply:
“Use a condom every time you have anal, vaginal, or oral sex.” How You Can Prevent Sexu-
ally Transmitted Diseases, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/
std/prevention/default.htm (last visited Nov. 5, 2013).  Condom usage is not merely recom-
mended by doctors, but it is also a widely publicized piece of health advice; for example, the
City of New York branded its own condoms, complete with citywide advertisements.  Sewell
Chan, A New Condom in Town, This One Named ‘NYC’, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2007), http://
www.nytimes.com/2007/02/15/nyregion/15condom.html?_r=2&.  Indeed, even popular life-
style magazines insist upon the regular use of condoms; Cosmopolitan urged ladies to require
condom usage of their male sexual partners and offered a “hands-on” guide to putting them on,
while GQ gleefully reported that the return on investment of a condom is 114,266%. A Brief
Course on Condoms, COSMOPOLITAN (June 9, 2003), http://www.cosmopolitan.com/sex-love/
advice/a1565/course-on-condoms/; Mark Byrne, What’s the Return on Investment for a Con-
dom? 114,266%., GQ (Sept. 16, 2014), http://www.gq.com/blogs/the-feed/2014/09/return-on-
investment-condom-114266.html.
90 Antiretroviral therapy reduces the risk of opportunistic infection and suppresses viral
loads.  It is recommended by the Department of Health and Human Services. See generally
Guidelines for the Use of Antiretroviral Agents in HIV-1-Infected Adults and Adolescents,
AIDS INFO, http://aidsinfo.nih.gov/contentfiles/lvguidelines/adultandadolescentgl.pdf (last vis-
ited Nov. 18, 2015).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CJP\25-1\CJP105.txt unknown Seq: 15 23-DEC-15 16:59
2015] INJECTIONS, INFECTIONS, CONDOMS, AND CARE 259
sexually transmitted infections is widely taught91 and publicized.92  The
tort of negligence punishes not transmission, but a failure to exercise
reasonable care.93  So long as the HIV-positive individual met a reasona-
bly prudent standard of care, he has not committed a tort, even if the
virus was transmitted.  As discussed in more detail below, that risk
(greatly reduced if both parties are observing their respective standards
of care) is simply one incurred by the decision to become sexually active.
B. Disclosure and Serostatus
The elegance of a tort solution to the problem of HIV transmission
is that one size need not fit all: the reasonable person standard considers
the totality of the circumstances in which the person behaved.  Thus,
disclosure will probably be required in most cases to meet the standard.
However, as the body of medical data about transmission rates grows—
particularly transmission rates among those whose viral load is undetect-
able—the disclosure requirement may diminish in importance.  A re-
quirement of disclosure represents a complex interplay between the
actual risk of transmission (with other prudent cautionary measures, quite
low) and the fearsome public image of HIV.
The central tension is: what risks would a reasonable person consid-
ering intercourse with an HIV-positive person take?  The plague-like
horror of the AIDS epidemic’s early days lends the disease a reputation
for fatality that is no longer accurate.  Distinct from its early days, AIDS
is a chronic, but treatable condition.94
Of course, if a person is unaware of his HIV-positive status, he may
escape liability despite actions that, if taken by a person who knows he is
HIV-positive, would result in liability.  Such a result presupposes two
conditions: first, that the individual observed the reasonable standard of
care for any person engaging in sexual relations, and second, that the
individual does not achieve ignorance through willful blindness.
Though the standard of care for an HIV-negative person is more
relaxed than that for an HIV-positive person, it requires him or her to act
reasonably as well.  While the precise formulation will likely change
from fact finder to fact finder, it is not difficult to imagine what reasona-
ble care for an HIV-negative, sexually active individual might involve.
91 Sexual education is widespread: 22 states require sexual education, and 37 states re-
quire that information on the benefits of abstinence be provided. State Policies in Brief: Sex
and HIV Education, GUTTMACHER INST. (Nov. 1, 2015), http://www.guttmacher.org/
statecenter/spibs/spib_SE.pdf.
92 Id.  19 states require that condom usage be taught in schools. See also supra note 89. R
93 EPSTEIN, supra note 58, at 69.  This is in contrast to strict liability, which applies R
liability regardless of whether the actor employed reasonable care. Id. at 70.
94 Living with HIV, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/
hiv/living/index.html (last visited Nov. 20, 2014).
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It likely requires condom usage,95 which is widely recommended by phy-
sicians, and regular testing, which will be discussed further in this Note.
So long as the reasonably ignorant HIV-positive person follows the
standard of reasonable care for a sexually active person, tort liability
should not attach.  It may be true that discussing willful blindness sepa-
rate of the general standard of care is redundant, but the use of a tort
liability structure in the HIV-transmission context would—at least ini-
tially—seem to incentivize willful blindness.  Thus, I address it sepa-
rately to show why a tort framework would not actually incentivize
willful blindness in the HIV/AIDS context.
Willful blindness—the intentional failure to take steps to avoid
knowledge of wrongdoing—amounts to constructive knowledge, and
would offer our hypothetical person no safe harbor.  In the context of
HIV-transmission liability, willful blindness would take the form of a
sexually active party who refuses or neglects to be tested for sexually
transmitted infections in order to avoid the heightened preventative steps
that the reasonable person standard would require of a sexually active
person with a sexually transmitted infection.  Such a scheme, however,
would fail.  For one thing, to be sexually active with more than one part-
ner and refuse to be tested for sexually transmitted infections is so fool-
hardy that it falls below the standard of reasonable care.96  Indeed, so
uniform is the opinion of physicians, epidemiologists, and medical pro-
fessions that sexually transmitted infection screening is imperative.  For
sexually active individuals who have more than one partner engaging in
95 Among the many medical authorities uniformly exhorting regular condom usage are
the Centers for Disease Control, which bluntly state: “Use a condom every time you have anal,
vaginal, or oral sex.” How You Can Prevent Sexually Transmitted Diseases, CTRS. FOR DIS-
EASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/std/prevention/default.htm (last visited
Nov. 5, 2013).  In 1987, Surgeon General C. Everett Koop urged condom usage.  Shocking to
many, who expected a more conservative Surgeon General, Dr. Koop wrote that absent proof
that one is not infected, “you must protect your partner by always using a rubber (condom)
during (start to finish) sexual intercourse (vagina or rectum).” C. EVERETT KOOP, SURGEON
GENERAL’S REPORT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME 17 (1986), http://
profiles.nlm.nih.gov/ps/access/NNBBVN.pdf.  Courts, too, have noted that condom usage is a
must.  In Doe v. Roe, the court referred to condom usage, stating: “Both parties in an intimate
relationship have a duty to adequately protect themselves.”  598 N.Y.S.2d 678, 681 (1993).
Even a formative influence in the author’s own life—the late Lady Pearl, resident drag queen
at a Gainesville, Florida gay nightclub—urged condom use regularly.  She closed every per-
formance with a colorful signature phrase: “Wrap it up!  Because no injection is worth the
infection . . . .”
96 The Centers for Disease Control recommend yearly testing of common sexually trans-
mitted infections and more frequent testing depending upon certain risk factors. STD & HIV
Screening Recommendations, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://
www.cdc.gov/std/prevention/screeningReccs.htm (last visited June 30, 2014).  The United
States Preventative Services Task Force, an independent board appointed and funded by the
Department of Health and Human Services, recommends screening for all sexually active men
and women.  David Meyers et al., USPSTF Recommendations for STI Screening, 77 AM. FAM.
PHYSICIAN 819, 819 (2008).
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sexual activity without regular testing, their refusal to test for infections
likely falls below the standard of reasonable care as a matter of law.97
Numerous courts have declined to limit negligence liability in a sex-
ual infection case to actual knowledge and instead have embraced con-
structive knowledge.98  The Supreme Court of California noted that
requiring actual, rather than constructive, knowledge of HIV infection
not only conflicted with the definition of negligence, but also presented
perverse and socially undesirable incentives against testing and treatment
for the disease.99  Similarly, Maine requires “knowledge or its
equivalent.”100  Louisiana also accepts both actual and constructive
knowledge for cases of infection.101
Initially, it might appear problematic that an HIV-positive person
who knows of his serostatus would incur liability for behavior that, if
undertaken by an HIV-positive person who reasonably does not know his
serostatus, would not result in liability.  At closer examination, however,
this result is not inconsistent with the result under many existing criminal
statutes that require knowledge as an element.  This result comports with
criminal law’s usual requirement of mens rea.  So long as a person’s
ignorance of his serostatus is objectively reasonable—and his behavior
met the required standard of care—no liability should attach.  Such an
outcome is satisfactory because requiring “reasonable care” to consist of
heightened caution in the case of an HIV-positive individual reflects two
considerations: first, the knowingly HIV-positive person is the most effi-
cient risk manager,102 and second, tort liability incentivizes the reasona-
ble person to take precautions when he or she is dangerous.
An interesting question is whether an infected person with knowl-
edge—or constructive knowledge—of his status is required to disclose
his serostatus to his sexual partners.  Currently, the overwhelming an-
swer is “yes.”103  Courts have widely recognized a duty to inform in
97 This is a difficult standard to meet.  Judgment as a matter of law requires the court to
find that no reasonable jury would find otherwise. See FED. R. CIV. P. 50.
98 John B. v. Superior Court, 137 P.3d 153, 161 (Cal. 2006).
99 Id.
100 McPherson v. McPherson, 712 A.2d 1043, 1046 (Me. 1998) (quoting MacDonald v.
Hall, 244 A.2d 809, 814 (Me. 1968)) (“The duty of taking care[ ] . . . presupposes knowledge
or its equivalent. The knowledge may be actual or that with which he is reasonably chargeable,
by reason of events which could be foreseen or reasonably anticipated.”).
101 Meany v. Meany, 639 So. 2d 229, 234 (La. 1994) (“[U]nder traditional negligence
concepts, the duty to take reasonable steps to protect against injurious consequences resulting
from the risk is based on the defendant’s actual or constructive knowledge.” (citing Kent v.
Gulf States Utilities Co., 418 So. 2d 493, 497 (La. 1982))).
102 It is more efficient, economically speaking, for a single high-risk individual to take
additional (more onerous and more expensive) precautions than to require all sexually active
adults to take those expensive precautions.
103 See, e.g., John B., 137 P.3d 153 (holding that a defendant has a duty to disclose his
HIV-positive status to a sexual partner); Endres v. Endres, 968 A.2d 336, 340 (Vt. 2008)
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cases where a defendant has a sexually transmitted infection such as
herpes, gonorrhea or HIV.104  This answer, however, hinges upon the
definition of duty.  In their classic treatise on torts, Professors Prosser
and Keeton define duty as “an expression of the sum total of those con-
siderations of policy which lead the law to say that the plaintiff is entitled
to protection.”105  This definition of duty represents a court’s balancing
act, which weighs the state’s interests in protecting other citizens and
halting the spread of disease against a defendant’s interest in privacy.
On this question, courts continuously come down on the side of the pub-
lic interest.106  A Minnesota appellate court provides a paradigmatic ex-
ample of such reasoning in favor of public interest, stating that “courts
have long recognized that the preservation of public health is a matter of
great public importance.  Legal duties and rules must therefore be de-
signed, whenever possible, to help prevent the spread of dangerous, com-
municable diseases.”107
Yet, depending on the circumstances of the case in question, there
may not be a genuine threat to public health or interest inherent in the
infected party.  As discussed earlier, new treatments and precautions can
reduce the chances of transmission considerably—perhaps even to infini-
tesimally small probabilities.  Some courts recognize that the balance be-
tween public health and privacy is dictated by the circumstances of each
case, and thus is not a permanent per se solution.108  The court in Long v.
Adams noted that the duty owed by those with sexually transmitted infec-
(“Although we have not addressed the question directly, courts have uniformly imposed on
persons with communicable diseases a tort duty not to infect others.”); Robinson v. Louie (In
re Louie), 213 B.R. 754 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 1997).
104 See R.A.P. v. B.J.P., 428 N.W.2d 103, 108 (Minn. 1988) (“[P]eople suffering from
genital herpes generally have a duty either to avoid sexual contact with uninfected persons or,
at least, to warn potential sex partners that they have herpes before sexual contact occurs.”);
Berner v. Caldwell, 543 So. 2d 686, 689 (Ala. 1989) (“[O]ne who knows, or should know, that
he or she is infected with genital herpes is under a duty to either abstain from sexual contact
with others or, at least, to warn others of the infection prior to having contact with them.”).
Though these cases deal with herpes and not HIV, the doctrine points upon which they turn are
identical to those upon which the duties of a person infected with HIV would turn.  Indeed,
many of the cases dealing with HIV/AIDS, a relatively new illness, cite cases dealing with
herpes, gonorrhea, or some other sexually transmitted infection. See, e.g., Doe v. Roe, 267
Cal. Rptr. 564, 567 (Ct. App. 1990), cited in Robinson, 213 B.R. 754.
105 WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 53
(5th ed. 1984).
106 See, e.g., R.A.P., 428 N.W.2d at 107.
107 Id. at 106 (citing Skillings v. Allen, 173 N.W. 663, 664 (Minn. 1919)).
108 Long v. Adams, 333 S.E.2d 852, 855 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985) (“It should be made clear
that this court is not stating here that herpes victims have a specific duty to warn any person of
their condition; however, they, like all citizens, are to be guided by those considerations which
ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, and they may be sued in this state for negli-
gence in the omission to do something which a reasonable person would do.”).  Far from a
mere tautology, the court here recognizes that reasonableness is a flexible standard that re-
sponds closely to circumstances.
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tions to their partners was merely “the same one that every individual in
this state owes another: the duty to exercise ordinary care not to injure
others.”109  The court in Long went on to specify that “[i]t should be
made clear that this court is not stating here that herpes victims have a
specific duty to warn any person of their condition,” ruling instead that
such people are held simply to the reasonable person standard, which—
in the circumstances of this case—included a duty to warn.110  This ap-
proach seems to leave the door open for more fact-intensive inquiries in
the future where one might imagine a situation in which, thanks to proper
precautions and treatment, the risk of transmission is minimized to such a
degree that the infected party need not inform his partner.
As intriguing as a thought experiment about a case in which disclo-
sure is not required might be, such a point is not yet here and perhaps
never will be.  The statistics for new treatments for HIV are too young to
be interpreted with any degree of certainty.  Furthermore, the law has a
long history of applying liability to infectious diseases, and such a tradi-
tion is not easily diverted.  Finally, disclosure offers a sexually active
party the unparalleled opportunity to select the level of risk with which
that person is comfortable—those who are particularly nervous or risk-
averse may demur from engaging in sexual conduct with an HIV-positive
individual, even after being presented with information about the relative
unlikelihood of contracting the illness from a partner who receives the
proper treatment.  Likewise, an individual who is not so risk-averse may
be willing to engage in sexual relations with an HIV-positive person—or
a person who has an undetectable viral load, but not one whose viral load
has not yet been suppressed.  Insomuch as one of tort law’s key functions
is risk management, relaxing the requirement for disclosure may be dis-
favored because such relaxation transfers risk management from the po-
tential victim to the potential tortfeasor.
C. Assumption of Risk and Plaintiff’s Conduct
Until now, this Note has focused on a defendant’s behavior in a tort
action based on HIV transmission.  Any encounter resulting in the trans-
mission of HIV, however, requires at least two parties.  Another advan-
tage of addressing HIV transmission through tort rather than criminal law
is that tort law offers a more involved analysis of the plaintiff’s actions.
Though criminal law arguably considers the actions of the victim in lim-
ited circumstances, such as those of self-defense111 or defense of
109 Id. at 854.
110 Id. at 855.
111 See DRESSLER, supra note 57, at 222.  A claim of self-defense depends on the actor’s R
perception of the victim’s actions.  Note that the actor himself or herself is still the major focus
of the law.
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others,112 it is largely unconcerned with the victim’s actions.113  Criminal
law punishes offenses as actions against the state and its authority, not
simply offenses against a victim.114  Consider, for example, that criminal
cases are named with the state as a party and prosecuted using public
funds.  On the other hand, the plaintiff’s actions in a tort suit are often
dispositive and decisions turn on whether the plaintiff gave consent,115
assumed the risk of injury,116 or acted negligently.117  The defense of
assumption of risk allows courts to consider the actions of both parties.
Assumption of risk—itself a flexible tort doctrine—can be of cru-
cial importance in analyzing HIV transmission liability.  Assumption of
risk comes in two varieties: implied and express.118  Express assumption
of risk deals with contractual agreements where plaintiffs agree not to
hold defendants liable.119  Express assumption of risk need not detain us
here long—contracts regarding legal liability are rarely presented prior to
sex, and those who attempt to secure a signature before an amorous en-
counter seem unlikely to continue on to behavior that might transmit
HIV.
On the other hand, implied assumption of risk does not require a
contract between the plaintiff and defendant.  Certain behaviors carry in-
herent risks—skiing, for example, carries the inherent risk that one might
112 See id. at 255.  A claim of defense of others, like a claim of self-defense, also involves
the victim’s actions.
113 Importantly, one must note that mitigating factors, justifications other than defense,
and excuses hinge upon the actions of the actor, not those of the victim.  For example, an actor
afflicted with schizophrenia may attack an innocent bystander and plead an excuse, perhaps
that, for example, the actor believed the victim to be a demon attempting murder.  Such a
defense would be an excuse, which admits that the actor’s deed was wrong, but that the actor
was not responsible for the deed. See id. at 463; DRESSLER & GARVEY, supra note 23, at 463. R
Here, the law focuses on the actor’s behavior, not the victim’s.
114 See DRESSLER, supra note 57, at 1.  (“[U]nlike torts and contracts, the criminal law R
involves public law. . . . [A] crime involves more than a private injury.  A crime causes ‘social
harm,’ in that the injury suffered involves ‘a breach and violation of the public rights and
duties, due to the whole community, considered as a community, in its social aggregate capac-
ity.’” (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5 (1769))).
115 That consent is so important to tort law is another example of the difference between
criminal offenses against society and tort offenses against a victim.  Generally, one cannot
consent to a crime—there is no consent to murder, for example.  Some crimes include a lack of
consent in the definition of the crime—for example, rape and assault—but that the crime’s
definition includes consent does not mean that one can consent to the crime.  Consenting to a
touch means that an assault simply did not occur, not that one had consented to be assaulted.
116 Here again, risky behavior does not absolve the criminal of responsibility.  Though it
is risky and indeed foolhardy to walk at midnight in a dangerous area of town, doing so does
not excuse one’s attacker of criminal responsibility.
117 Plaintiff’s negligence may give rise to defenses of contributory or comparative negli-
gence, depending on which state’s tort law is being applied. See EPSTEIN, supra note 58, at R
210.
118 Id. at 197.
119 JOSEPH W. GLANNON, THE LAW OF TORTS 538 (4th ed. 2010).
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collide with a tree.120  By choosing to engage in such activities, a plain-
tiff is assuming certain inherent risks.121  As Justice Cardozo noted, “One
who takes part in such a sport accepts the dangers that inhere in it so far
as they are obvious and necessary . . . .”122
The question that then arises is, in which situations does a sexual
adventurer assume those risks?  Much like defining the reasonable stan-
dard of care above, defining exactly which situations result in assump-
tion of risks is an enterprise that will be largely left to lay juries.
Nevertheless, it is possible to raise certain arguments.  On one end of the
spectrum is behavior that almost certainly indicates an assumption of
risk: unprotected sex.  As noted earlier, the fact that sex without a con-
dom can and often does lead to sexually transmitted diseases is widely
disseminated in high schools, colleges, nightclubs, and television pro-
grams.  Indeed, one New York court held that a person who engages in
unprotected sex assumes the risk of infection with a sexually transmitted
disease, colorfully noting that “[w]hen one ventures out in the rain with-
out an umbrella, should they complain when they get wet?”123
What, then, of risks that arise from protected sex?  It is common
knowledge that condoms occasionally fail.124  There is, however, little in
the judicial opinions that directly addresses this point.  Taking Justice
Cardozo’s formulation of the assumption of risk as our lodestar, we must
ask if the risk is “obvious and necessary.”125  Here, the risk is neces-
sary—it is physically inherent to the activity.126  The risk is also obvi-
ous—it is well publicized and widely disseminated.  Actors who choose
120 According to the National Ski Areas Association, skiing and snowboarding resulted in
54 deaths from 2011 to 2012, or approximately 5.5 deaths per million skiers. Facts About
Skiing/Snowboarding Safety, NAT’L SKI AREAS ASS’N 1 (Oct. 1, 2012), https://www.nsaa.org/
media/68045/NSAA-Facts-About-Skiing-Snowboarding-Safety-10-1-12.pdf.
121 As Professor Joseph Glannon concisely explains the concept to generations of desper-
ate first-year students mere days or hours prior to their examination, “A plaintiff may . . .
accept risks simply by engaging in an activity with knowledge that it entails certain risks.”
GLANNON, supra note 119, at 539. R
122 Murphy v. Steeplechase Amusement Co., 166 N.E. 173, 174 (N.Y. 1929).
123 Doe v. Roe, 598 N.Y.S.2d 678, 681 (1993) (“A person assumes the risk where he
voluntarily subjects himself to a peril known to him or generally observable by a person of
ordinary prudence in his situation . . . . In the same vein, persons who engage in unprotected
sex, at a time of the prevalence of sexually transmitted diseases, including some that are fatal,
assume[ ] the risk of contracting such diseases.”).
124 The CDC estimates that the typical failure rate of condoms is 18%. Contraception,
CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/reproductivehealth/
unintendedpregnancy/contraception.htm (last visited Feb. 24, 2015).
125 Murphy, 166 N.E. at 174.
126 As many sexual education programs stress, abstinence from sexual activity is the only
absolutely safe form of sexual activity.  Even Planned Parenthood decrees: “Being continu-
ously abstinent is the only way to be absolutely sure that you won’t have an unintended preg-
nancy or get an STD.” Abstinence, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, http://www.plannedparenthood.
org/health-info/birth-control/abstinence#sthash.6KpCJpFx.dpuf (last visited Jan. 18, 2015).
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to engage in sexual relations—absent circumstances such as fraud or de-
ception127—accept a certain amount of inherent risk.128  As for those
who are unwilling to accept that risk—well, “[t]he timorous may stay at
home.”129  The dearth of opinions resulting from tort claims for infection
implies that finding assumption of risk in a protected sexual encounter
remains untested.  Though arguable, this interpretation is doctrinally
sound.
D. The Future of Criminal Transmission
In the absence of state criminal transmission statutes, the primary
legal recourse for those who have had a sexual encounter with an HIV-
positive person would be an action in tort for negligence or negligent
infliction of emotional distress.  Criminal sanctions under statutes that
proscribe assault and attempted murder, however, remain in force.  The
first prosecutions against those who transmitted HIV were brought under
such statutes,130 and new prosecutions can be brought under those stat-
utes once again.  Requiring future criminal cases to be brought under
such statutes ensures that only the most egregious of cases—those in-
volving malicious and criminal intent—are treated with criminal
sanctions.131
Criminal sanctions are appropriate for cases such as Williams’s.
Nevertheless, criminal sanctions are not effective weapons in the public
health battle against HIV/AIDS,132 and they should not be used merely to
discourage behavior, but rather only to punish individuals whose behav-
ior manifests clear, harmful, and criminal intent.
CONCLUSION
The problem of HIV/AIDS is not going away soon.  Indeed, after a
brief lull, transmission rates are rising alarmingly once again, particularly
127 As discussed above, those who know or should know that they are infected have cer-
tain duties above and beyond the risks that their partners accept. See supra notes 91–94. R
128 “[I]ndividuals who engage in these recreational events do so out of choice and not
necessity, so a jury may infer assumption of risk from the circumstances of the transaction.”
EPSTEIN, supra note 58, at 207. R
129 Murphy, 166 N.E. at 174.
130 See WEBBER, supra note 22. R
131 The reservation of criminal penalties for only the most egregious of cases is a position
championed by David W. Webber, author of the treatise AIDS and the Law.  In that publica-
tion, he elucidates a seven-prong requirement for cases meriting criminal sanction, including
that “[t]he offense’s conduct must have posed a clear and medically significant risk of trans-
mission of HIV (not merely a theoretical risk), and the accused must have failed to employ
reasonable prophylactic measures,” and that “[t]he accused must have been aware of the risk
of HIV transmission posed to the victim by the offense conduct.” WEBBER, supra note 22, at R
7-8.  Such requirements are appropriate: they ensure that the case is indeed one of criminal
intent, and not simple negligence that is best handled through tort law.
132 Id. at 7-7.
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among young gay men133 and African Americans.134  Until medical sci-
ence eradicates the disease, it is something with which millions of Amer-
icans must live.  Accordingly, it is time to brush away outmoded and
outdated laws and address the epidemic in a clear-headed and orderly
fashion.  Elegant in its flexibility, tort law has handled personal wrongs
for centuries.  It is time to return transmission of HIV cases to where
they belong—tort law.
133 HIV Among Gay and Bisexual Men, supra note 37; see also HIV Among Youth, CTRS. R
FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/hiv/group/age/youth/index.html
(last visited June 30, 2015).
134 HIV Among African Americans, supra note 36. R
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